The Eagles Future at Fullback

Only five teams in the NFL gave fewer snaps to their fullbacks in 2011 than the Eagles. Owen Schmitt had almost no impact on the offense, registering only 173 snaps — almost half the snaps of fourth/fifth wide receiver Riley Cooper. That’s a sharp decline from 2010, when Schmitt took over for Leonard Weaver after the first game and played in 352 snaps.

Moreover, Schmitt’s contribution on the field was limited. He carried the ball four times, ran passing routes 73 times, and pass blocked 25 times — all tasks that could have been better performed by other players. Even his 71 run blocking attempts, just over 4 per game, were at best at replacement level.

Overall, Schmitt is entirely expendable. Either through free agency or the draft, it wouldn’t be difficult to upgrade the fullback position.

However, the Eagles have long been uninterested in investing even moderate resources at fullback. Leonard Weaver was an exception, but he was also a great change-of-pace running threat. Without him, the Andy Reid has reverted back to ignoring the position. And even more so this year, as he often utilized two tight end formations with Clay Harbor instead of employing Schmitt.

The question is what to do going forward. I have no interest in retaining Schmitt or another player of his caliber. It’s a wasted roster spot that provides special teams snaps and poor offensive return.

Instead, I’d like to see the Eagles turn their diminished use of the fullback spot into an asset, by converting the position into something worthwile. How so? I can think of two ways.

The first would be to find a new version of Weaver, the RB-FB hybrid. Dion Lewis looked like he may be capable of holding down LeSean McCoy’s back up spot next year. However, his running style isn’t exactly bruising. If the Eagles signed someone like the Chiefs Le’Ron McClain, he could fill that dual role of FB-RB, and potentially free up a roster spot somewhere else. Stanley Havili — anyone remember him? — had a redshirt year on the Eagles practice squad. A draft option (taken as the most speculative of recommendations) might be Baylor RB Terrance Ganaway, who happens to be the Jeremiah Trotter’s nephew.

The second option would be to look for a more versatile H-Back. Harbor is already filling this hybrid role somewhat for the Eagles, although he’s more likely to line up as a wide receiver than as a fullback. With the offense going to more and more two tight end sets, it would be nice to keep a third guy on the roster. Having him do double duty as a part-time fullback could be a great way to get value out of the roster spot. National Football Post’s Wes Bunting projects Evan Rodriguez, tight end for Temple, as a late-round H-Back option.

The point is that keeping things as they are wastes a roster spot on a replacement-level player who is outclassed at basically every function he’s asked to perform. Even Schmitt’s role in the run game is being eclipsed. Why not try something new?

Photo from Getty.

Jeff McLane has the scoop:

The Eagles are set to hire former Miami interim head coach Todd Bowles to be their defensive backs coach in charge of cornerbacks and Juan Castillo will remain defensive coorindator an NFL source told The Inquirer on Monday.

Well, if they weren’t going to fire Juan Castillo, and they weren’t going to hire Steve Spagnuolo to oversee the defense… I suppose this is about the best you can expect.

Bowles has been a defensive backs coach in the NFL for the last 12 years. He became the Dolphins’ interim head coach after Tony Sparano was fired in December.

Jim Armstrong at Football Outsiders analyzed “Aggressiveness Index” for coaches going for it on fourth down last season. Andy Reid ranked 12th, with an above-average .983 AI score.

What’s most interesting, however, is that over the last 12 years of data Armstrong compiled (including 2011), Andy Reid scored dead last among all 88 qualifying coaches. Over that span, Reid went for it on fourth down on only 10.6 percent of possible attempts, for an AI of .594. But last year he attacked on fourth downs 19.6 percent of the time — nearly double.

Andy was still near the bottom of the league (26th) in 2010. Seems like someone used the lockout to bone up on statistics…

Jim Washburn, the Draft, and Size at DE

Linebacker is by far my preferred first round draft choice for the Eagles. Given the severe dearth of talent at that position, it’s not even a particularly close decision in my mind.

That said, teams shouldn’t reach too far for need. You should attempt to select the best player available, lest you end up with another Danny Watkins. With that in mind, I could easily see the Eagles going with a different position in the first round, perhaps cornerback after they trade Asante Samuel, or, more likely, defensive line.

Whether or not it’s the first round, Jim Washburn could use an infusion of youthful talent along the front four. Trent Cole and Jason Babin are both Pro Bowl-caliber ends, but they’re both closer to the end of their prime than they are to the start — and the situtation behind them is murky. Brandon Graham is coming off a serious injury and a lost season. Darryl Tapp and Philip Hunt have had their moments in the Wide Nine, but neither can be trusted to take over as a starter if needed.

The defensive tackle spot is in a similar situation, but I’m just going to look at defensive ends today. The question is, what kind of end does Washburn want? And the answer to that question suggests that there may be more turnover than we think.

At right are the defensive ends selected in Tennessee in the 12 years Washburn was coaching there. He must have had tremendous input into which players were taken. In theory, these are players that are prototypical for what Washburn wants to do at the position.

The thing that jumps out at me immediately is their size. Washburn’s only drafted two defensive ends shorter than 6’4”. And his free agent picks have all been in that 6’4”-6’6” range too: Kyle Vanden Bosh, Dave Ball, Kevin Carter, etc.

It’s just an interesting piece of trivia until you look at the Eagles current group of ends. Tapp is only 6’1”. Hunt is 6’0”. Graham,at a generously labeled 6’2”, would (given the opportunity) be the smallest defensive end who’s ever started for Washburn. Now, this doesn’t rule them out completely. If they’re good enough they’ll play, regardless of size. Both Cole and Babin, listed at 6’3”, are still on the small side of Washburn’s range.

(Note: Washburn’s tackles have been on average 6’3”. Only Cedric Thorton and Antonio Dixon currently fit that mold.)

But, with that in mind, I wouldn’t be surprised if those two and Graham are the only players at defensive end who return in 2012.

Tommy Lawlor, the authority on all things Eagles draft, mentioned some of the defensive ends scouting consultant Phil Savage talked to at the Senior Bowl. Based on Washburn’s preferences, I would be surprised if the Eagles selected the relatively short Melvin Ingram or Courtney Upshaw. Cam Johnson, a player Tommy likes a lot, would a more natural fit at 6’4”.

Come April, the Eagles have ten draft picks. I could easily envision a scenario in which they spend four of them on the defensive line, and at least two at end. And when you’re shuffling through prospect profiles for a preview of players who might end up in Philly, keep your eye on height as a key factor.

Photo from Getty.

Howie Roseman Reevaluating the Draft Process

One of the headlines coming out of Howie Roseman’s comments yesterday (here and here) was that the Eagles GM is open to changing his draft strategy, given the results so far. His exact words were:

“I think those are things that you have to look at and kind of evaluate and see if maybe you’re putting too much weight on one area and not another. Those are the things that you got to learn from and figure out.”

It was a vague statement, but one I’m glad to see. The last two drafts have been poor overall, and it’s vitally important that Roseman reevaluate his decision-making process going forward.

Regarding that process, Roseman had a few more quotes that shed light on some of the areas we had only assumed from his draft results. For example, Howie admitted that drafting the best player on the board is difficult when “human nature” gets involved and “you are pushing things up because there are things you want and whether that’s a specific position or a specific quality in a player — whether that’s toughness, intelligence, leadership.”

I’ve noted in the past that Roseman has almost exclusively drafted high character players with proven track records from big schools. Perhaps that’s a winning philosophy in general, but it has caused some notable misses (including everyone’s favorite bugaboo Jason Pierre-Paul).

Roseman expanded those thoughts regarding Brandon Graham:

“We’re talking about a guy that played four years at Michigan, was a two-time captain, averaged ten sacks a year. There was a great track record of success. I think for us, it wasn’t so much about the other players as it was the consistency he showed in college. A lot of times when you’re into the draft you have these decisions about making kind of what we talk about — doubles vs. Dave Kingman trying to go for the long ball. I’m not talking about a particularly player here, but those are some of the tough decisions that you have because you have other factors involved.”

Kingman, the 6’6” slugger/strike out artist from the ’70s and ’80s, sounds like an oblique reference to Pierre-Paul, but the point applies generally as well. With picks like Graham, Nate Allen, Danny Watkins, and Jaiquawn Jarrett, Roseman has tended toward safe, “doubles” players with leadership and steady performance — if not tremendous upside.

Maybe that’s reassuring, since all but Jarrett have at least shown the ability to be solid NFL starters. But we’re also not looking at any of these guys saying, “Wow,” like we are with DeSean Jackson and LeSean McCoy — players who had big questions marks coming out of college but also amazing star potential.

The final comment I want to highlight stems from a rewriting of history that Roseman supporters have often used:

“We feel like we’re having success, and if you get five or six players in every draft who make the team and three of them are starting, you’re drafting pretty well. Do we want impact guys in the first round? Of course we do. We want to draft those Pro Bowl guys and hit on every guy in the first round, but we’re going to look under every rock for impact guys, and if we get them in the sixth round or from the CFL or in free agency, the main thing is getting good players who can help us win.”

Roseman has done well at finding contributors in the later rounds, guys like Jamar Chaney, Kurt Coleman, Brian Rolle, and Jason Kelce. But other than Kelce (whose rookie season was overrated), none of these guys look like starters on a playoff team. They were starters for the Eagles in 2011 because of failures in the earlier rounds, and performed at about replacement level. More “successful” results like that won’t help the team get back to the Super Bowl any time soon.

At least Howie seems to realize that.

Photo from Getty.

If I’m going to bash him for his poor articles, the least I can do is commend Jeff McLane for giving us fun anecdotes from the Senior Bowl:

A few funny/odd moments from the Senior Bowl today. When @LesBowen and I were going to have our q&a with Howie, Drew Rosenhaus spotted us and said to Howie, “Don’t let them double team ya, Howie.” Um, OK. So, Drew, will DeSean be OK with the franchise tag? “Uh, no comment.”

The other came when we were talking to Washburn and Les teased him about the report that he kept Spags from coming to the #Eagles, and as Les went to pat him on the shoulder, Wash gave him a swim move & swatted his hand away. “Good Times with Wash” should be a reality show.

For actual, consequential notes, I suggest you visit Jimmy and Tommy, since they are killing it from Mobile.

The Mess of Pro Bowl Cornerbacks

It’s quite a feat to turn a strength into a weakness. That’s what Juan Castillo and Johnnie Lynn managed to do to the Eagles’ elite trio of cornerbacks.

Coming into the season, the three Pro Bowlers were supposed to be an asset that covered up the Eagles inexperience at safety and linebacker. Instead, we were frequently left to wonder if the coaches had any plan to use them effectively at all. The biggest problem was that through most of the season no one figured out how to play Asante Samuel, Nnamdi Asomugha, and Dominique Rodgers-Cromartie all in the same lineup.

After they decided not to trade Samuel, the Eagles assumed that Rodgers-Cromartie could man the slot, a position he was uncomfortable with from the start. In yet another example of poor self-scouting, that turned out to be an awful idea.

Courtesy of Pro Football Focus, here are Asomugha’s and Rodgers-Cromartie’s stats at the two positions (Samuel played almost exclusively outside):

Starting with Asomugha, it’s worth noting that by these metrics he was stellar. Among cornerbacks with at least 25 percent of snaps, Nnamdi ranked first overall in coverage snaps per target, sixth in yards per snap, and second in snaps per reception. Each figure was down from 2010, as he was targeted more often, but they were all still elite.

Regardless, Asomugha provided similar performance no matter where he lined up. He had slightly more targets in the slot, but didn’t allow anything big.

Contrast that with Rodgers-Cromartie, who posted a massive split playing in two different positions. Out of the 44 corners last year with 25 percent or more slot snaps, he ranked 39th in snaps per target, 44th in yards per snap, and 41st in snaps per reception. That is awful. He was arguably the worst slot corner in the NFL.

Put Rodgers-Cromartie outside, and everything changes. In fact, DRC’s numbers on the outside were even better than Asomugha’s. As bad as he was on the inside, Rodgers-Cromartie was one of the best corners in the league when he was playing at his natural position.

Toward the end of the season Rodgers-Cromartie began to get more snaps outside. Partially that was to replace an injured Samuel, but even before that Asomugha would often play the slot in nickel and dime. Clearly, that was a much better defensive formation than what they had going on earlier — and that it took so long to implement is another black mark against Castillo.

Looking forward, I expect Samuel to be traded, freeing up space for DRC to play outside all the time. While Asante is still a great cornerback, playing to everyone’s strengths will be easier next year. The cornerbacks might actually be the fool-proof strength we all expected six months ago.

Photo from Getty.

Semi-annual blogger Derek Sarley:

VOA is a measure of how well a team has played and DVOA corrects for opponents, so you can throw out any concerns about strength of schedule and say things like “DVOA proves the Eagles have the league’s twelfth-best defense, even if you claim they didn’t play very many teams that were any good.”

Except you can’t. DVOA says nothing of the kind, as we can best demonstrate with a couple of charts. Here’s the first one, plotting this season’s DVOAs against VOAs:

Long story short, opponent adjustments are nice, especially for comparing teams quickly. But DVOA and its ilk will never be able to provide a complete understanding of a single team or unit. Even advanced stats need context.

Peter King:

Someone Who Knows told me a major roadblock to Steve Spagnuolo taking the defensive coordinator job in Philadelphia was the presence of very strong personality Jim Washburn on the defensive line.

This doesn’t surprise me. The Wide Nine was always a red herring in talks about whether a new coordinator would be compatible with Washburn. The bigger issue is that a new coordinator would have to cede all control of the line to his supposed underling. Remember, Washburn doesn’t take orders from anyone.

Jeff McLane:

Is there any correlation between size and regular-season success? Yes, but in some cases no.

Let me summarize this article for you:

What if the problem on defense is because the Eagles draft small players? Could it be? Maybe, if I repeat the question enough. They are undoubtedly small, though. Well, unless you compare the Eagles to similar defenses. But I’ll call them tiny anyway. Does it matter? This small sample size says yes. But not this slightly larger group. Forget it, I’m just going to cherry pick some stats that support my argument.

Jason Wilde, for ESPN Milwaukee:

“You look at it now, even though they’re saying that stuff, before the season and throughout the whole offseason, everybody had that attitude that they could just replace me, that I was just another player. ‘We can just let him walk,’” Jenkins said in a telephone interview Wednesday afternoon. “Certain players spoke out publicly about guys they hoped they’d bring back, but back then you didn’t hear anybody say too much about me. So I don’t pay it too much attention.”

The Packers’ loss was the Eagles’ gain. I’ll be surprised if the Eagles choose to cut Jenkins just so they don’t have to pay him the $5 million roster bonus in March.

Steve Spagnuolo and a Franchise on the Decline

Just a few weeks ago, Jeffrey Lurie stood behind the podium and argued that retaining Andy Reid representedthe best chance for the Eagles to win a Super Bowl next season. But as Steve Spagnuolo, the odds-on favorite to replace Juan Castillo, chose New Orleans instead, that wisdom comes into doubt.

Regardless of playoff results, Lurie was right when he said that the true class of the NFC is represented by the Packers and Saints. Everyone else is playing catch up. And on a day when the best defensive coordinator on the market picked the Saints instead of the Eagles, Reid’s team looks like it’s only losing ground.

Let’s be clear. Regardless of the length or seriousness of the talks between him and the Eagles front office, Spagnuolo knew what he’d be getting into in Philadelphia. He knows Reid, the front office, the situation on defense, probably better than he did the Saints job or any other. The fact that he avoided returning to Philly doesn’t bode well for the Eagles organizational health.

I would say that Spagnuolo’s preference to stay away represents a certain canary-in-the-coal-mine warning, but we already had that last year when the Reid fell back to Juan “Plan H” Castillo. The head coach has had success luring older, mercenary-type assistants to the staff in the last two years. Bobby April, Jim Washburn, Howard Mudd have all had positive impacts on the team. But Reid has now struck out twice (three times if you count McDermott) in trying to bring an experienced veteran in to run the defense.

Lets go back to the Packers and Saints for a moment and their two great offensive-minded head coaches in Mike McCarthy and Sean Payton, not unlike Andy Reid. Both have utilized “defensive head coaches” to win a Super Bowl — Dom Capers and Gregg Williams. Now Steve Spagnuolo will slide into the spot in New Orleans vacated by Williams.

The Eagles used to have a defensive head coach in Jim Johnson. Reid knew his limitations and almost won a Super Bowl with Johnson dialing up blitzes independently from his oversight. Payton and McCarthy have stolen from that playbook, but Reid’s original copy is gathering dust in a closet somewhere.

When Reid announces next week that his first choice at defensive coordinator was always bringing back Castillo, not only will he be lying, but it will be an example of how far he’s fallen from the realm of elite NFL coaches, as well as the latest indictment of an organization stuck in neutral.

Perhaps next season will provide a rebound playoff year, and both Reid and Howie Roseman will refurbish their reputations. But sitting here right now, it’s tough to be anything but pessimistic about the future of this franchise.

Photo from Getty.

Les Bowen at his best:

Trot was a leader in the locker room, and the unquestioned leader of the forces trying to get Owens restored to the active roster. He didn’t defend the things T.O. had done, but he seemed to think McNabb ought to just ignore the persistent undermining of his authority and leadership, because, hey, T.O. was a dominant player — probably THE most dominant player physically I’ve ever covered, in any sport — and the Eagles needed him to get back to the Super Bowl.

Football is a team game, though, the Daily News has learned, and you really don’t win the Super Bowl with a superstar wideout trying to tear down your quarterback. Reid later told me one of his biggest regrets was that he let that situation fester too long, tolerated too much. I eventually concluded McNabb was never viewed quite the same way again by his teammates.

Today, I think maybe Trot finally understands what the big deal was, why you don’t clasp a viper to your bosom, or whatever that passage in the bible says.

The whole post is definitely worth reading.

Is the Wide Nine to Blame for Poor Run Defense?

Since I’m worried that these may be some of the Eagles final days with Jim Washburn as defensive line coach, now is as good a time as any to analyze his impact on the defensive line. A few days ago I showed how Washburn formed an elite pass rush.

Today, let’s look at the run defense.

During the season the Wide Nine technique was often scapegoated for poor run defense. While no one doubted that the Eagles linebackers were awful, many also alleged that Washburn’s scheming put too much pressure on those overmatched LBs.

To that end, it’s worth examining the defensive line to see how much it contributed to the problem, if at all.

Football Outsiders numbers suggest that, if anything, the line was the only thing working correctly against the run. While they place the Eagles squarely in the middle of the league on adjusted line yards, the defensive line was third-best in the NFL at both power success (denying short yardage runs) and stuffed percentage (runs stopped behind the line of scrimmage). The bigger problems appeared in second level and open field yards, which are generally the responsibility of the linebackers and safeties.

But let’s look more specifically, player by player. Pro Football Focus has the numbers there:

At defensive end, I don’t see much cause for blaming Washburn. Both Trent Cole and Darryl Tapp improved on their tackle and stop percentages in 2011. Juqua Parker dropped off, but there’s little reason to think that was because of the Wide Nine.

Jason Babin does come out looking pretty bad here. Among defensive ends with at least 25 percent of their team’s run snaps, Babin ranked near the bottom — 51st — in stop rate. Unlike Cole, Babin isn’t a complete player. But if he can continue to put up big sack numbers, it won’t really matter.

The two main holdovers from 2010, Mike Patterson and Trevor Laws, both improved against the run last year. Broderick Bunkley helped Denver reach the second round of the playoffs, but the additions of Derek Landri and Cullen Jenkins more than made up for that loss.

Overall, I just don’t see any merit to the arguments that blame poor run defense in Jim Washburn and the front four. All signs point to the putrid tacklers playing behind them, not the line itself.