Why Is NFL Decision-Making So Bad?

The following is a guest post by @sunset_shazz.

Now is the winter of our NFL offseason, during which we contemplate Nick Foles’ trade value, as well as Joe Flacco’s. On twitter, @agoldman79 makes a key observation:

This assumes rational actors. When trades like the Amari Cooper trade happen, it disproves that.

— Adam (@agoldman79) February 9, 2019

To paraphrase Larry Summers: There are bad GMs. Look around. Our friend Brent at Eagles Rewind wrote about #BadGMTheory way back in 2013, and the evidence continues to accumulate. The 32 NFL teams, as a whole, seem to make decisions which are suboptimal. For example, Bucs GM Jason Licht, who is 27-53 (0.338), famously traded up to draft a kicker in the 2nd round, yet still enjoys a W-2 income. Giants GM Dave Gettleman ignored the data, mocked the nerds at their keyboards, and drafted a running back with the 2nd overall pick. Though an excellent player, the offensive rookie of the year has not proven to be worth either the high pick or the highest guaranteed salary for a running back in the NFL. Other GMs are adept at public relations while remaining cartoonishly inept at actual decision-making. Sam Bradford’s candidacy as a First Ballot Hall Of Fame Negotiator rests entirely on the exploitation of incompetent counterparties. I have found, previously, evidence that NFL GMs inefficiently prefer white candidates, to the detriment of playoff berths, when hiring coaches. All these decisions are examples of terrible ex ante process, regardless of ex post outcome.

Why is NFL decision-making so bad?

In an intensely competitive, testosterone-and-bravado-fueled meritocracy, why is NFL organizational stupidity so pervasive, persistent and pronounced?

I am always suspicious of monocausal reasoning, and my guess is that the answer is likely multivariate: NFL culture is dominated by “football guys” who are resistant to change, there is an old boy network that inhibits ideas from other domains from propagating, and of course there are idiots.

Ultimately, the crux of the principal-agent problem lies with the principals, rather than the agents. NFL owners are bad at setting the incentives for their employees. Dirk Koetter (as a coach, not a GM) admitted on the record that he made decisions in order to keep his job, even when he knew it would lose more games in the long run. But this answer merely begs the question.

Why are NFL owners so bad?

A key theoretical underpinning of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is that “noise traders” (idiots) will have less influence over time than their more successful counterparties. Market forces impose a Hobbesian, Darwinian discipline, through losses (rather than profits): those that are unfit perish.

For NFL teams, relative profits (there are never losses) are not determined by a market. Each team shares a common pool of more than $8 billion in league-wide revenue which is derived from gate sales, merchandising, broadcast rights, etc. The NFL is a Marxian socialist’s paradise. You can be an incompetent charlatan who has committed fraud and racketeering and your NFL team will still make money because (a) the team has a franchise which effectively secures monopoly rents and (b) revenue sharing by the NFL creates the most generous social safety net the world has ever seen.

Simply put: the NFL lacks a mechanism for creative destruction.

Very few other domains of American life enjoy such coddled insulation from market forces. A hedge fund that defaults on a trade typically blows up. A dishwasher, housekeeper or middle class entrepreneur who behaves as incompetently as the Browns would face inevitable penury. Only Jed York is afforded the latitude to be as incompetent as Jed York.

The NFL’s socialist utopia is sanctioned by a Federally-mandated antitrust exemption. Never mind Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez – the most fervent big-government socialists in America are represented at 345 Park Ave. As a consequence, the relative absence of market discipline allows them to make decisions with the acuity of Soviet central planners. Incompetents of the world, unite!

On Dallas Goedert And The Eagles' Two-Tight End Dominance

Are you curious why the Eagles drafted a second tight end, Dallas Goedert, when they already have Pro Bowler and Super Bowl-winner Zach Ertz on the roster? Look no further than The Athletic, where I penned an article recently that examined the Eagles' use of multiple tight end sets last year. The numbers surprised me, especially what emerged about the Eagles in the red zone, in the playoffs, and specifically the effectiveness of Ertz and Trey Burton in the same formation. Make sure to subscribe to The Athletic Philly (hat tip to the inimitable Sheil Kapadia for asking me to contribute) and check it out:

‘Big bodies on smaller bodies’: Why the Eagles doubled down on the two-tight end offense

Dave Gettleman Vs. The Nerds

The following is a guest post by @sunset_shazz.

New York Giants General Manager Dave Gettleman is a true football man (#TrueFootballMan). He has no time for nerds who sit behind their keyboards. Though some may be concerned about drafting a running back second overall, he is not. From his recent presser after picking Saquon Barkley:

I think a lot of that’s nonsense. I think it’s someone who had this idea and got into the analytics of it and did all these running backs and went through their – whatever. Hey, Jonathan Stewart is in his 10th year and he’s hardly lost anything.

Gettleman appears to believe that the case against using a top 10 pick on a running back rests on perceived longevity. He is misapprehended.

Ben Baldwin, an economist (and Seahawks fan) who makes his living sitting behind his keyboard, summarized the case against using a premium pick on a running back in an excellent post at Field Gulls – do read the whole thing. I’m going to expand on two subsets of his argument: that rookie first round running back contracts are bad values, and bad risks.

The objective of the first round of the NFL draft is to sign an above-average player at a below-average contract for 4 years, with an embedded team option in year 5. Article 7 of the 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement specifies a rookie wage scale that varies based on the draft pick used to select the player. Importantly, after the 2011 CBA was implemented, the player’s position doesn’t matter: a player picked 2nd overall is paid the same money over 4 years, whether he is a quarterback, running back or long-snapper. Moreover, the market has reached an equilibrium where first round contracts are fully guaranteed. A quick survey of contracts at overthecap.com shows that position value for post-rookie contracts varies significantly in today’s NFL. As a result, the “rookie contract discount” varies dramatically by position. For example, a QB drafted with the 2nd overall pick in 2018 would be the 25th highest paid QB in the league (by average annual compensation) and would have the 15th highest guaranteed money. An RB selected 2nd overall would immediately become the 4th highest paid player at his position, with the highest guaranteed money – all before taking a single professional snap.

The chart above shows selected positions, with their leaguewide positional salary rank plotted against overall draft number (all data courtesy overthecap.com). Running back is the clear outlier – a top 10 pick is automatically among the highest paid RBs in the league.

Here is the same plot for guaranteed money (the rookie contract is compared to the veterans’ amount guaranteed on their current contracts):

Though the 2011 CBA’s wage scale typically serves as a price ceiling for rookies, with running backs drafted in the first round, it serves as a de facto price floor. In terms of guaranteed money, the three highest RB contracts in the league are Barkley (2018, drafted 2nd overall), Leonard Fournette (2017, 4th) and Ezekiel Elliott (2016, 4th). Here are the top 10 picks in this year’s draft, with their annual compensation and total guarantee compared to their league peers by position group (players in top 10 highlighted in red):

The New York Giants have thus expended the #2 draft pick (a considerable use of capital) for the privilege of paying Barkley the #4 annual salary and #1 guarantee at his position. They are paying (through the nose) not just once, but twice!

But perhaps Gettleman is merely acting upon justified conviction. If Barkley is a generational player, surely he’s worth it?

As Ben Baldwin notes in his piece, 1st round running backs have a high bust rate relative to other positions. Data scientist Dr. Sean J. Taylor sent me the following plot, exploring this idea further:

This plot evaluates the set of running backs drafted (or undrafted) between 2009 and 2014. The x-axis represents draft position. The y-axis is the player’s Wins Above Replacement (nflWAR) over the ensuing 4 years. NflWAR is a statistic developed by Yurko, Ventura and Horowitz of Carnegie Mellon University which uses multinomial logistic regression to isolate the contribution of individual players to NFL wins. NflWAR represents a novel effort to advance beyond Approximate Value (AV), and deserves wider recognition.

I draw 3 conclusions from the scatterplot above:

1.     Taking a running back early is risky (bottom left quadrant);

2.     It is possible to find success at running back in later rounds;

3.     Running backs don’t really matter very much (note the Y-axis scale – over 4 years, you get at best 1.5 extra wins from a running back, and typically 0.25 extra win; quarterbacks are approximately 4x more important).

The risk of a bust is even more acute with highly drafted running backs, because the financial commitment to the player is so much higher, relative to other players at the same position. A bust at QB taken at 2nd overall saddles you with the salary of a bottom quartile starter. A bust at RB at the same pick saddles you with a top 4 salary.

But there is no good alternative to taking such a risk, right? Don’t you need to take risks at RB in order to win championships? Ezekiel Elliott, Leonard Fournette and Todd Gurley (taken 4th, 7th and 10th overall, respectively) are commonly cited as evidence of risks that have paid off.

One recurrent theme here at MoK is the application of insights from behavioral science to football. Our past posts have relied heavily on the work of Gary Becker, Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, William F. Sharpe, Kahneman and Tversky again and Joseph Henrich. Today’s post is dedicated to 1990 Nobel Laureate Harry Markowitz who demonstrated that a portfolio of individually risky assets can collectively carry less risk than any of its underlying constituents, even when adjusted for its prospective return.

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The above chart shows the three commonly cited high pick successes, and the RB-by-committee groups of the two Super Bowl teams. The “Draft Capital” column dispenses with the archaic Jimmy Johnson scale, instead using Dr. Michael Lopez’s blended draft curve which improves on prior efforts by not only paying attention to expected/modal outcomes, but also giving weight to the probability of drafting a superstar (i.e. the right tail of the distribution). PHI and NE expended between 1/4 and 1/7 the draft resources for their running backs as JAX, DAL and LAR. Though PHI and NE paid relatively high 2017 cap numbers, they locked up minimal resources over the long term (i.e. they could cut bait in 2018). The “gty” column shows guarantees over the entire contracts of those players (Sproles’ and Blount’s initial guarantees for PHI, Gillislee’s, Burkhead’s and White’s for NE).

The advantage of the portfolio approach is: you can be wrong, and still have success. Donnel Pumphrey is not good at football and Darren Sproles was lost for the season. Gillislee, Burkhead and White did not cover themselves in glory in 2017. The portfolio approach diversifies you against injury, suspension or disappointing play. Yet, each portfolio achieved similar yards/attempt and total yards as the 3 high draft picks, for less overall guarantee / draft capital. As a team, NE and PHI ranked 1st and 8th in offensive DVOA, respectively (the Eagles won the Super Bowl). Also, note that NE’s total 2017 expenditure, while high, was less than Le’Veon Bell’s cap number. JAX additionally paid $6MM in 2017 for Chris Ivory, who offered minimal return for this expenditure. As Harry Markowitz showed, the portfolio approach offers something vanishingly rare in economics: a free lunch. A properly constructed portfolio lowers risk, without sacrificing expected return. (Though running backs are risky, they are independently risky. Idiosyncratic risk is diversifiable.)

In summary, Dave Gettleman in his press conference constructed a straw man. The case for positional value does not rest on running back longevity. Instead the TL;DR argument is as follows:

• Using a high draft pick on a running back is a bad bet. At best, you expend draft capital in order to pay a guaranteed contract at a market equivalent price for a good player. At worst, you overpay twice: in draft capital and guaranteed salary for a bad player.
• Drafting a running back is risky.
• By assembling a portfolio of RBs, one can achieve similar performance to drafting a star, while diversifying risk, and saving draft / guarantee capital to deploy elsewhere.
• Your mother was right about eggs and baskets.

The above argument relies upon the prior work of a number of individuals who sit behind keyboards, all of whom have advanced degrees in a quantitative field such as economics, and none of whom have played a snap of professional football. Gettleman, a #TrueFootballMan, will confidently dismiss this argument, regardless of its merit, due to its provenance. Eagles fans should pray he never gets fired, and lives forever.

Numbers Are No Substitute For Trust

The following is a guest post by @sunset_shazz.

The news of Cleveland head of personnel Sashi Brown’s dismissal was met with uncharacteristic emotion by the customarily sober Aaron Schatz. Evidently, some quarters of the analytics community regard Brown, his colleague Paul DePodesta and the rest of the Browns front office team as one of their own. Brown’s strategy consisted of trading high draft picks for more (albeit lower ranked) picks. The opportunity cost of this strategy was to pass on both Deshaun Watson and Carson Wentz.

Talent evaluation is hard. You will be wrong more often than you will be right. I won’t fault Brown for misevaluating quarterbacks, just as I don’t fault 32 teams for repeatedly passing on Tom Brady (even the Patriots passed six times before using their 7th highest pick on him). There is data that suggests the market for talent evaluation is efficient and that no team has a sustainable edge.

But it doesn’t follow that just because you aren’t able to out-evaluate your peers, you should always trade down. Higher draft picks have higher success rates. The idea that lower picks might be undervalued dates from a classic 2005 paper by Cade Massey and newly-minted Nobel Laureate Richard Thaler. Massey-Thaler observed that NFL teams were overvaluing high picks relative to “the surplus value of drafted players, that is the value they provide to the teams less the compensation they are paid.” (Emphasis in the original.)

Two things have changed since 2005. First, the 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement repriced the rookie wage scale, increasing the “surplus value” of higher picks relative to lower picks. [1] Secondly, the market learned and absorbed the Massey-Thaler result. We know from other domains that market inefficiencies almost always disappear as soon as they are found. Sashi Brown’s claim that talent markets are efficient – yet the market for picks is systematically inefficient – is an extraordinary claim, which demands extraordinary evidence. More likely, the market has moved from partial to general equilibrium. Football has no farm system; the strategy of hoarding picks is constrained by the 63-man roster and practice squad. Successful teams with quietly robust analytics departments (e.g. the Eagles and Patriots) trade both up and down, depending on the situation; constrained optimization is complicated. Moreover, as Brian argued in 2011, in order to fill the most critical position on an NFL team, the data shows you need to pick early.

But the real reason that Jimmy Haslam absolutely had to fire Sashi Brown is simple: his staff failed to execute a trade which was negotiated in good faith. Whether it exists under a buttonwood tree in lower Manhattan or in a coffee house in eighteenth century London, all markets are governed by rules, traditions and norms. As an example, the market for trading picks, which often occurs while teams are on the draft clock, is governed by trust and verbal agreements (not legal documents).

As Joseph Henrich notes in his brilliant anthropological survey The Secret of Our Success, pro-social norms are enforced in small communities through punishment, such as ostracism. In any community of traders, walking away from a duly negotiated agreement is a flagrant violation, a taboo. I will never forget how at the beginning of my career the head of our firm reacted to a similar situation: “We will never do business with those scumbags again, and we will make sure everybody knows how they have behaved.”

Punishing norm violators is not irrational. A trust-based community of traders is a fragile equilibrium. Erosion of trust can cause permanent, deadweight losses; thus pro-social norm enforcement evolves over time, and is Pareto efficient.

If Haslam had not fired Brown, some or all of the other 31 teams would have punished the norm violator by refusing to trade with Cleveland. This is both individually rational (trading with a deadbeat counterparty is risky) and collectively rational (pro-social norms promote gains from trade). Brown’s reputation as a counterparty was permanently impaired, thus compromising his ability to discharge his duties, and leaving Haslam with no choice but to clean house.

[1] Brian Burke found continued persistence of a second day surplus value anomaly, though it’s still early in terms of data, and as he notes, the replication model is sensitive to key methodological assumptions. His results cover the player market, but not the draft pick market.

Offense Taken

The following is a guest post by @sunset_shazz.

Earlier today, DN columnist David Murphy published a contrarian piece purporting to show that the Eagles have neglected the offensive side of the ball in the draft under Chip Kelly. His lazy “analysis” consisted of counting up Eagles draft picks for the offensive and defensive units over the past 3 years. Even the dullest of readers can see the problem: this method equates the pick of Lane Johnson with that of Jordan Poyer. Or Zach Ertz and David King.

When pressed upon this obvious flaw by friend of the blog Noah Becker, Murphy accused his interlocutor of poor reading comprehension:

The Eagles spent 2 1sts, 3 2nds, 1 3rd round pick, and a 4th round pick on offensive players since 2013. https://t.co/avOT0i8dSu

— Noah Becker (@Noah_Becker) November 17, 2015

@Noah_Becker but i'm not going to annotate the piece for you. if you legitimately can't see it, then, yes, you are a poor reader.

— David Murphy (@ByDavidMurphy) November 17, 2015

Well, Mr. Murphy, we at McNabb or Kolb are both literate and numerate. One can easily assign values to the Eagles draft picks to determine the actual allocation of draft resources to each unit. The canonical draft value chart was developed by Jimmy Johnson in the early 1990s. For many years, this provided a sufficient first order approximation of relevant draft value. However, in 2012, the excellent Chase Stuart conducted an exhaustive analysis which used the approximate value provided by a player in his first five years with a team to construct a draft value curve; like all good scientists, he published his results.

Using these values, we can compute the approximate draft value allocated to each unit by the Eagles in the Chip Kelly era:

As is shown above, over the past 3 years, the Eagles picked 6 players on offense, at an average draft position of 48th overall. Although they picked 15 players on defense, these averaged at a draft position of 152nd overall. Using Chase Stuart’s draft value weights, the Eagles allocated 58% of their draft value to the offense and 42% to the defense; a balanced allocation, reflecting the front office’s desire to build a balanced team. Murphy’s claim that the offense was neglected in the draft is simply untrue (unless you believe a 1st round pick is equal to a 7th rounder).

Moreover, during our research we also discovered the earth-shattering news that the NFL has a salary cap. In 2015, the Eagles allocated $69.4 million to the offense, the highest(!) number in the league. To argue that the Eagles have neglected the offense in their allocation of resources is either lazy or disingenuous. Or both.

The Eagles’ woes are more prosaic: rather than being inattentive to the offense, the front office suffered from poor execution. Allowing the offensive line to age while failing to build adequate depth, using three high picks on one position in two years, guaranteeing money to the insipid Riley Cooper, over-allocating salary to an aging running back who has carried more than 400 times the previous season, cutting their best receiver for #footballreasons without recompense, trading a draft pick for a speculative upgrade at QB – these are all legitimate criticisms of the front office strategy. But accusing Chip Kelly of neglecting to spend resources on the offense… the evidence doesn’t support that extraordinary claim.

It’s one thing to mail in a column. It’s quite another to insult your readers’ intelligence when your obvious shortcomings are pointed out. Eagles fans and Daily News readers aren’t as dumb as some writers make us out to be. 

@sunset_shazz is a Philadelphia Eagles fan who lives in Marin County, California. He previously wrote about Chip Kelly's Oregon bias and also contributed to the 2015 Eagles Almanac.

Year Two Begins: An Eagles Offseason Rundown

This time last year, fresh off a sickening 4-12 season and the long-anticipated firing of one of the best coaches in franchise history, we watched as the Eagles spun their wheels in a coaching search. Fresh off being rejected by some of their top candidates, the organization seemed to be turning toward Gus Bradley, although interviews with Bruce Arians, Brian Kelly, and rumblings about Ken Whisenhunt cast an ominous cloud over the proceedings. It wouldn't be until January 16th that Oregon's belle finally came back around and agreed to a surprise contract in Philadelphia.

Chip Kelly's arrival was met with lots of fanfare, and more than a few skeptics. I won't bother to link to those old columns written about the "college coach" and his "gimmick offense," but suffice it to say that no one's a skeptic now. If anything, we're still underestimating the job he did in his first year. Before the season began, I found all 113 teams in Football Outsiders' database that finished 20th or worse in both offensive and defensive DVOA. Those bad teams had an average overall DVOA improvement of +11.9% in their next season. Kelly's Eagles, as it stands now, posted a +37.8% increase, the third-largest jump on record.

But with an early bounce from the playoffs, the long offseason looms and more changes are inevitable. In today's NFL, huge improvement can always be followed by huge disappointment. In my opinion, the Eagles are much more likely to add to, grow from, and improve off of their 2013 success. But that's far from guaranteed. Here's where the team goes from here:

1. Prune The Dead Wood

Being only a year away from a 4-12 season, there are still a number of players on the Eagles roster who shouldn't be around at training camp next year, whether for reasons of age, performance, or both. Let's do a quick roundup of the top targets.

• Todd Herremans: Even moving back to guard this season didn't seem to halt the Toddfather's decline. He's not the worst guard in the league, but Herremans was the weakest link on the offensive line and you can't expect him to get better heading into his age-32 season. Maybe you offer a restructured contract and the chance to compete for his job, but guard is one of the more fungible starting positions in the league. Time to see if there's a younger, less expensive backup who can take over.
• Trent Cole: The Eagles' longtime DE-turned-OLB passed Clyde Simmons for second place on the Eagles all time sack list with a late season revival. Like Herremans, Cole is heading into his age-32 season and the third year of a contract extension. Despite his resurgence in the second half of the season, Cole never fully adjusted to his linebacker role and couldn't rescue the Eagles' moribund pass rush. We wish him the best, but it's time to move on. 
• Brent Celek: Another member of the old guard, Celek turns 29 before the end of the month. He proved his worth blocking, made some key receptions down the stretch, and finished with his highest DVOA since 2008. But Zach Ertz figures to replace him more and more as the down-the-field tight end. Celek is probably still a useful player on this team for his versatility, but he's not worth the $4 million salary he's due next year. Prime (Stache) restructure candidate.
• James Casey: That was always a one year deal, disguised as three years. Not a bad blocker (and the Eagle could use an H-Back/FB from time to time), but barely saw the field the field for anything else. He probably would rather seek his fortune elsewhere too, although maybe he comes back on a reduced salary as the 3rd TE.
• Jason Avant: While Riley Cooper and DeSean Jackson had big DVOA improvement, Avant was one of the few Eagles offensive players to decline this year. He had perhaps his worse season statistically in at least 5 years. Love the leadership, but Avant's not sticking around.
• Patrick Chung: Another guy on a fake 3 year deal who should and will be cut posthaste.
• Alex Henery: I'll go into depth on this once I can crunch more numbers, but Henery isn't worth keeping for beans. 

2. Keep An Eye On

There are difficult decisions elsewhere too. Would be surprised if any are cut this offseason, but the team has reason to examine these relationships closely.

• DeMeco Ryans: Leader of the defense and stout run defender who's a major liability in coverage. Turns 29 this summer and has a contract that's easy to do away with. Don't think you cut him yet, but the conversation about the future has to happen.
• Cary Williams & Bradley Fletcher: Let's consider the two corners together. Using a broad stat like passer rating, both of these players were middle of the pack. On a good defense, each is probably a solid #2 corner. They're not going to shut down the other team's top receiver one-on-one, but they'll hold their own against most everyone else and get their share of victories. The question is how highly you value that kind of production. Both Williams and Fletcher have salaries that spike substantially in 2014. Do you let one go to make room for Brandon Boykin? Do you keep them both around another year and draft replacement(s)? Could a restructure/extension be on the table?
• Brandon Graham & Vinny Curry: Both are young and relatively inexpensive, so they probably get another year in this 3-4 transition. But if the right offer came along, Graham especially could be on the block.
• Jason Peters: Nothing big here but he's entering the final year of his contract. Peters was named to his fifth All-Pro team but looked like he lost a step. Eagles hope to already have his replacement on the roster (Lane Johnson), but we can't rule out an extension if he proves he's still capable. Remember, Tra Thomas manned the left tackle spot in Philly until he was 34.
• DeSean Jackson: His salary goes up by over 50% in 2014. Hopefully both he and the team are happy with that. Or not.

3. Are They Worth Keeping?

Retaining your own free agents can be tricky, but this year there aren't too many questions. The big decisions come at wide receiver.

• Jeremy Maclin: The biggest name on this list comes with a huge "What If?" label following his ACL tear last August. I was on record for a Maclin contract extension before the injury and still want him back. The question is how healthy he is and what kind of money he's looking for. The market for wide receivers isn't especially deep, but you don't often see guys get big money coming off knee injuries. A one-year deal with the Eagles might make sense for both sides.
• Riley Cooper: The wide receiver went from racist problem-child to key contributor quickly. He has size, blocks well, and adjusts to deep balls better than most. But on a good team he's a 3rd or 4th wide receiver, and I wouldn't pay him more than that because he'll never be someone who can consistently beat single-coverage. In other words, let him test the market (where there may not be much interest) and only resign him at a backup rate.
• Michael Vick: If he resigns himself to taking a paycheck as a backup, there are worse places to do it than Philadelphia. But maybe he's looking for one last shot at a starting role, and he could get it with the Jets, Jaguars, or somewhere else.
• Donnie Jones: Fantastic job this season. Sign the man.
• Nate Allen: Actually became the best member of the safety corps, which just shows how bad the safeties were. Let him walk.
• Kurt Coleman: Bye.
• Colt Anderson: Never going to be a competent safety, but still a great special teams player. Bring him back and let him compete.

4. Seek Improvement From Youngsters

The last two drafts have been tremendously successful for the Eagles, and they have more than a handful of young players who are forming a new backbone to this team. Their improvement (or decline) will largely decide how the team does in 2014 and beyond. It will also determine who deserves contract extensions and who might not be worth the trouble.

• On defense, the young studs are Brandon Boykin, Mychal Kendricks, and Fletcher Cox. They've all shown flashes, but where is the ceiling? Meanwhile, Bennie Logan and Earl Wolff will be given every opportunity to win starting jobs, but both need to make big leaps this offseason.
• On offense you're looking at Lane Johnson, who had a successful rookie season by mostly avoiding making news. All eyes will be on him next year, to see if he can take over at left tackle after Jason Peters. Zach Ertz also seems inline for a big year as the featured tight end in 2014.
• Nick Foles' offseason matters the most. I'm not convinced he's a franchise quarterback, but he played like one in 2013. Defenses will study him intently next year, and he's unlikely to maintain his fantastic interception rate. Can he improve in other areas to maintain an edge? Foles has earned the benefit of the doubt, but we will find out.
• As for backups: guys like Bryce Brown, Chris Polk, Dennis Kelly, Damion Square, Najee Goode, and Matt Barkley need to prove they're worth trusting. Does Casey Matthews get another year? What about Curtis Marsh, Roc Carmichael, and Julian Vandervelde? Lots of question marks.

5. Identify Obvious Roster Holes

Last offseason, the Eagles had gaping holes across the defense. They drafted a smattering of young players (Wolff, Logan), and added low-to-mid price veterans (Barwin, Williams, Fletcher, Chung, Sopoaga). Due to the relative success of that plan, there aren't as many problem spots as there were a year ago. Here are the main starting spots that need help.

• Safety: It's easy to imagine a future where Wolff is the only guy left from last year, and he's certainly not a sure thing. Major upgrade still needed here.
• Pass Rusher: The Eagles need to generate more of a pass rush. Some of that could come from improvement along the defensive line. But a dynamic pass rushing outside linebacker might make the biggest difference of anyone on the team.
• Wide Receiver: At the very least you bring back Riley Cooper, but ideally you're looking at someone more dynamic across from DeSean. Plus, a new slot receiver to replace Avant would be nice.
• Kicker: Forget field goals for a second. You need a kicker who can consistently reach the end zone on kickoffs.
• Nose Tackle: Logan may be the guy, but my lasting memory of him from 2013 will be the Saints blowing him off the line of scrimmage.
• Guard: If you jettison Herremans.

6. Plan For The Future

While you're logging the problems the team faces right now, it's also time to take stock of the future. Where will the team have holes a year or two from now?

• Cedric Thornton is an exclusive-rights free agent (meaning he can't negotiate with anyone else). One of the few eligible players on the roster probably worth a long term extension.
• Can't count on 30-something offensive linemen to stay healthy in the short term or sustain performance long term. Grab more depth on the offensive line. 
• Draft a quarterback. Always draft a quarterback.
• Kendricks looks like a keeper, but Ryans may not have more than a year left. Time to get another young middle linebacker.
• Boykin is probably a long term answer at cornerback, given his stellar performance in the slot. But tied to the Williams & Fletcher questions above, drafting more corners should be high on the list.

7. Find Difference-Makers In Free Agency

Building through the draft is great, but being active at the top of the free agent market is also important. I'm not talking about bringing in another Nnamdi Asomugha, but the Eagles will have plenty of cap space and few in-house players to spend it on. Howie Roseman and company must identify a few key players who can come in and not only fix problem spots in the short term, but are also good long term bets. Some candidates...

• Jairus Byrd: If the Bills safety makes it to free agency, he'll command top dollar. You'd rather he wasn't going into his age-28 season, but he's an All-Pro caliber player still in his prime who would immediately lock down one of the Eagles' safety spots.
• TJ Ward: Fellow second-team All-Pro safety may be slightly less expensive than Byrd. He's also nearly a year younger. Would be a great get.
• Eric Decker: Again, I'd rather just bring Maclin back. But Decker is a much better version of Riley Cooper (albeit at a significant markup). There's also the underachieving Hakeem Nicks out there
• Julian Edelman: Probably can go cheaper in the Avant-replacement department, but there aren't many better slot guys when healthy. Maybe Chip wants more upgrade here.
• Brian Orakpo: Who knows what's going on in D.C. these days? Elite pass rushers don't come cheap, but Orakpo would fit right into a key role on the Eagles defense.
• Donald Butler: If he makes to the open market, you could grab San Diego's young stud middle linebacker and jettison Ryans earlier than planned.

8. Refine The Scheme

To be fair, this is more than one-eighth of the offseason agenda, but it's the one that's least conditional on specific player debates. No matter who the Eagles bring back and who they add, the coaches have to adjust and prepare for a new season.

Chip's offense lit up the league, and ended up second only to Peyton Manning's Broncos on the DVOA chart. He'll be on every defensive coordinator's To-Do list this offseason. I have confidence in the head coach, since he's shown the ability to adjust his offense to two quarterbacks with opposite skill sets. But Kelly needs to stay a step ahead. Defenses stymied some of his schemes, and in some areas he became too predictable by the end of the season (see Cowboys and Saints defenders reading nearly every screen). New weapons will help on that front, but so will new wrinkles. I'm looking forward to seeing what he draws up in 2014.

When you switch to defense and special teams, it's worth noting that the team finished in nearly the same place as 2012 according to DVOA. The defense improved slightly, but there's still a long way to go. Patient, accurate quarterbacks (a species the Eagles were lucky to avoid for long stretches of the season) tore this defense apart with its weakness in coverage down the middle, complete lack of pass rush, and horrible missed tackles. Again, personnel was often at fault there, and this was only year one of a defensive scheme shift. But the scheme can't be as predictable going forward either. Time for Billy Davis to prove he can lead the unit to a renaissance.

Making Sense of the Matt Barkley Pick

There's been a lot of hand-wringing over the Matt Barkley pick and what it means for the Eagles, what it means for the other quarterbacks on the roster, and what it implies about Chip Kelly's offense. I've gone through all those same thoughts in my head over the last few days, trying to make sense of the whole thing.

My initial reaction was mostly shock. I had been operating under specific assumptions regarding Kelly's needs at quarterback -- based on his own actions -- and the Barkley selection didn't fit neatly into any of them. Tim McManus said it best:

Kelly has stated on numerous occasions that he is not married to a specific scheme and will cater to his players’ strengths. But a golden rule when reporting on a team is to watch what they do, not what they say. Up until this point, everything Kelly had done was pro-mobile quarterback. He made the decision to keep Michael Vick. Signed G.J. Kinne and Dennis Dixon. Released Trent Edwards. Nick Foles was on an island. And when word got out that the Kelly had already implemented the read-option, you wondered how Foles could compete and survive.

Eventually you get beyond that shock, though, and start to rationalize why Kelly would like Barkley. Maybe we were wrong about what he really wants for his NFL offense. Maybe he really values "repetitive accuracy" more than anything else. While Barkley was undoubtedly a value pick (the team passed over him 3 times), Kelly says the USC quarterback was in their top 50 players overall. This isn't the same as Mike Kafka being selected explicitly as a backup (also see: the Dennis Dixon signing). In fact, we have reason to believe that Barkley is more desirable to Kelly than either Michael Vick or Nick Foles -- both of whom he inherited.

This is where Chris Brown's interesting piece over at Grantland comes in. He posits that ​Kelly might not be trying to bring his Oregon offense to Philly, but rather import the New England Patriots offense:

In addition to drafting Barkley, among the major moves Kelly made was signing tight end James Casey in free agency and drafting Stanford tight end Zach Ertz, two movable chess pieces to go along with Philadelphia’s other multipurpose tight end, Brent Celek. These moves might be an indication that Kelly’s focus is shifting from the roster of speedy running backs and dual-threat quarterbacks he had at Oregon. Instead, Philadelphia may be looking to mesh the fleet-footed receivers already on its roster with a group of dynamic tight ends. As part of that group, Kelly is likely hoping Barkley can be an extremely accurate, intelligent, intangible-heavy quarterback who can efficiently operate his lightning-fast no huddle.

Brown's take is smart and logical. If Barkley does win the starting job, the offense would certainly cater more around his strengths and the read-option would be relegated to a side show. But the one thing that's tough for me to accept is that there was that much foresight in the selection of a fourth round player. To suggest that the Barkley pick -- which Kelly himself admits he didn't expect to make -- speaks some broader truth about the planned direction of the offense may be reading too much into it.  

This is where Kelly's own words come in. Check out what he said on WIP the other day:​

Obviously if you can get a quarterback that has great size, is really smart, can run, and do all those things, then yeah, let's go get him. But you don't always get the ideal guy, where in every category he's a ten. You have to value some categories more than other categories. There have been some unbelievable athletes that have played quarterback both at the collegiate level and the NFL, that can throw the ball and run 4.5 and do all those other things. But really, for a quarterback you have to be a great decision-maker first and foremost. Now, if the fact that we can run -- I think of that as a bonus, not as a prerequisite. 

This is the most complete answer I've ever seen Kelly give about the quarterback position. He likes to throw around phrases like, "We'll start whichever QB can get us to the endzone." But here he is talking about his ideal quarterback -- big, smart, fast, good decision-maker. These are traits that most teams look for, but Kelly admits that it's tough to get all of them. There's an implicit assertion herein that Barkley is not the whole package, the way someone like EJ Manuel could have been.

Kelly talks about trade-offs, and I think that's a better way to look at the Barkley pick -- as well as his stance on quarterbacks in general. Neither Barkley nor Foles is his ideal starter, so any assumption (like Brown's) that rests on a plan to abandon the read-option is flawed. However, it's clear that Vick's poor decision-making and ball skills put him at a disadvantage as well. Kelly will evaluate the trade-offs with each player and make a choice based on that. If Vick's experience, athleticism, and arm strength trump the strengths of his non-mobile brethren, he'll start and the read-option will certainly be a part of the offense. Or it will go the other way.

​Shifting your offense to match your quarterback's strength isn't some foreign concept. Andy Reid went through a bunch of dissimilar quarterbacks over the years: Donovan McNabb, AJ Feeley, Jeff Garcia, Kevin Kolb, Michael Vick, Nick Foles. He had a base system predicated on the West Coast offense, but play calling adapted based on who was taking the snaps. Kelly's offense will the be the same way. Doubtless he will start with spread concepts, translating Oregon ideas for use with playmakers like DeSean Jackson, LeSean McCoy, and Bryce Brown. His no-huddle offense (and its unique play-relay system) will be a major factor, especially coupled with versatile weapons that allow the Eagles to take what the opponent gives them. 

After those core strategies (a "specific scheme" I believe Kelly is married to), ​the rest is detail. Without (yet) an ideal all-purpose quarterback like Robert Griffin III or Andrew Luck, the offense must make trade-offs. An up-tempo spread can be effective with the read-option or without, with Barkley or Vick. The question isn't who fits best into some mythical version of Kelly's offense -- it's who is the best, period. And we won't know that until training camp.

Photo from Getty.​

Third Day Eagles Draft Thoughts

As Friday night ended, the Eagles welcomed two more players to Philly, each giving us a another glimpse into the future under Chip Kelly. First was Stanford tight end Zach Ertz, a versatile and athletic weapon for the new offense.  A Stanford alum friend sent me a text right after the selection that just said, "Zach Ertz is a beastttttt." He lined up all over the formation last year and caught 68 passes, including 11 for 106 yards and a touchdown against Oregon. Kelly is clearly moving in the direction of a multi-tight end offense and this pick fits perfectly into that mold. In his press conference, Kelly talked about the match-up problems versatile tight ends can create:

"We are going to go three tight ends in a game. Now, if they go three linebackers, we spread them out and if they go DB's, we smash you. So, pick your poison. Simple game, isn't it? You guys thought coaching was hard. They bring little guys in, you run the ball. They bring big guys in, you throw the ball."

If they really are going to play a lot with three tight ends, I can see a lot of logic behind the pick. However, I wonder what this means long term for Brent Celek. James Casey was also brought in this offseason, but he's a smaller H-Back-type. Ertz, on the other hand, is basically a taller, faster version of Celek (many comparisons have been made to Jason Witten). The Eagles' incumbent starter only just turned 28, although Celek has taken a lot of big hits over the last six years and his salary from 2014-2016 becomes completely pay-as-you-go. He has no more guaranteed money after this year and can be cut or traded without cap penalty. If Ertz progresses quickly, I expect Celek will be playing for someone else before long.

With their third round pick, the Eagles selected 6'2", 309 lb LSU defensive tackle Bennie Logan. After the pick, Kelly and Howie Roseman talked about how important it is that Logan has the versatility to collapse the pocket from the middle, as opposed to just being a run stopper. ​However, the NFL comparison CBS Sports makes for Logan may be instructive:

Compares to: Brodrick Bunkley, DT, New Orleans Saints -- Just as it was for Bunkley when leaving Florida State seven years ago, the talent is in Logan to develop into a legitimate NFL starter and perhaps even turn into a standout. To do so, however, he'll need to develop a greater array of pass rush moves. Otherwise, his strength and effort should be enough to help him carve out a niche as a solid run-stuffing presence in the middle.

​Bunkley was a massive man and unmovable force in the run game. However, he never did develop into that pass rush threat that the Eagles hoped for. Still, even if Logan remains limited, he seems like a great candidate to play the 5-technique defensive end and -- if he can add a few more pounds -- move inside to replace Isaac Sopoaga at nose tackle.

​As for Saturday's final rounds, my main desire is for the team to load up on defense. Sure, I'd like a speedy running back/returner and more offensive line depth is never a bad thing. But overall the offense seems fairly set. The Eagles collapsed in the last few years largely because they didn't have talent on defense. They're not likely to find any stars in the later rounds, but competition is desperately needed at cornerback and safety. Outside linebackers who can help with the 3-4 transition are important too, as are more big bodies if the right one falls.

Photo from Getty.​