Dave Gettleman Vs. The Nerds

The following is a guest post by @sunset_shazz.

New York Giants General Manager Dave Gettleman is a true football man (#TrueFootballMan). He has no time for nerds who sit behind their keyboards. Though some may be concerned about drafting a running back second overall, he is not. From his recent presser after picking Saquon Barkley:

I think a lot of that’s nonsense. I think it’s someone who had this idea and got into the analytics of it and did all these running backs and went through their – whatever. Hey, Jonathan Stewart is in his 10th year and he’s hardly lost anything.

Gettleman appears to believe that the case against using a top 10 pick on a running back rests on perceived longevity. He is misapprehended.

Ben Baldwin, an economist (and Seahawks fan) who makes his living sitting behind his keyboard, summarized the case against using a premium pick on a running back in an excellent post at Field Gulls – do read the whole thing. I’m going to expand on two subsets of his argument: that rookie first round running back contracts are bad values, and bad risks.

The objective of the first round of the NFL draft is to sign an above-average player at a below-average contract for 4 years, with an embedded team option in year 5. Article 7 of the 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement specifies a rookie wage scale that varies based on the draft pick used to select the player. Importantly, after the 2011 CBA was implemented, the player’s position doesn’t matter: a player picked 2nd overall is paid the same money over 4 years, whether he is a quarterback, running back or long-snapper. Moreover, the market has reached an equilibrium where first round contracts are fully guaranteed. A quick survey of contracts at overthecap.com shows that position value for post-rookie contracts varies significantly in today’s NFL. As a result, the “rookie contract discount” varies dramatically by position. For example, a QB drafted with the 2nd overall pick in 2018 would be the 25th highest paid QB in the league (by average annual compensation) and would have the 15th highest guaranteed money. An RB selected 2nd overall would immediately become the 4th highest paid player at his position, with the highest guaranteed money – all before taking a single professional snap.

The chart above shows selected positions, with their leaguewide positional salary rank plotted against overall draft number (all data courtesy overthecap.com). Running back is the clear outlier – a top 10 pick is automatically among the highest paid RBs in the league.

Here is the same plot for guaranteed money (the rookie contract is compared to the veterans’ amount guaranteed on their current contracts):

Though the 2011 CBA’s wage scale typically serves as a price ceiling for rookies, with running backs drafted in the first round, it serves as a de facto price floor. In terms of guaranteed money, the three highest RB contracts in the league are Barkley (2018, drafted 2nd overall), Leonard Fournette (2017, 4th) and Ezekiel Elliott (2016, 4th). Here are the top 10 picks in this year’s draft, with their annual compensation and total guarantee compared to their league peers by position group (players in top 10 highlighted in red):

The New York Giants have thus expended the #2 draft pick (a considerable use of capital) for the privilege of paying Barkley the #4 annual salary and #1 guarantee at his position. They are paying (through the nose) not just once, but twice!

But perhaps Gettleman is merely acting upon justified conviction. If Barkley is a generational player, surely he’s worth it?

As Ben Baldwin notes in his piece, 1st round running backs have a high bust rate relative to other positions. Data scientist Dr. Sean J. Taylor sent me the following plot, exploring this idea further:

This plot evaluates the set of running backs drafted (or undrafted) between 2009 and 2014. The x-axis represents draft position. The y-axis is the player’s Wins Above Replacement (nflWAR) over the ensuing 4 years. NflWAR is a statistic developed by Yurko, Ventura and Horowitz of Carnegie Mellon University which uses multinomial logistic regression to isolate the contribution of individual players to NFL wins. NflWAR represents a novel effort to advance beyond Approximate Value (AV), and deserves wider recognition.

I draw 3 conclusions from the scatterplot above:

1. Taking a running back early is risky (bottom left quadrant);

2. It is possible to find success at running back in later rounds;

3. Running backs don’t really matter very much (note the Y-axis scale – over 4 years, you get at best 1.5 extra wins from a running back, and typically 0.25 extra win; quarterbacks are approximately 4x more important).

The risk of a bust is even more acute with highly drafted running backs, because the financial commitment to the player is so much higher, relative to other players at the same position. A bust at QB taken at 2nd overall saddles you with the salary of a bottom quartile starter. A bust at RB at the same pick saddles you with a top 4 salary.

But there is no good alternative to taking such a risk, right? Don’t you need to take risks at RB in order to win championships? Ezekiel Elliott, Leonard Fournette and Todd Gurley (taken 4th, 7th and 10th overall, respectively) are commonly cited as evidence of risks that have paid off.

One recurrent theme here at MoK is the application of insights from behavioral science to football. Our past posts have relied heavily on the work of Gary Becker, Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, William F. Sharpe, Kahneman and Tversky again and Joseph Henrich. Today’s post is dedicated to 1990 Nobel Laureate Harry Markowitz who demonstrated that a portfolio of individually risky assets can collectively carry less risk than any of its underlying constituents, even when adjusted for its prospective return.

The above chart shows the three commonly cited high pick successes, and the RB-by-committee groups of the two Super Bowl teams. The “Draft Capital” column dispenses with the archaic Jimmy Johnson scale, instead using Dr. Michael Lopez’s blended draft curve which improves on prior efforts by not only paying attention to expected/modal outcomes, but also giving weight to the probability of drafting a superstar (i.e. the right tail of the distribution). PHI and NE expended between 1/4 and 1/7 the draft resources for their running backs as JAX, DAL and LAR. Though PHI and NE paid relatively high 2017 cap numbers, they locked up minimal resources over the long term (i.e. they could cut bait in 2018). The “gty” column shows guarantees over the entire contracts of those players (Sproles’ and Blount’s initial guarantees for PHI, Gillislee’s, Burkhead’s and White’s for NE).

The advantage of the portfolio approach is: you can be wrong, and still have success. Donnel Pumphrey is not good at football and Darren Sproles was lost for the season. Gillislee, Burkhead and White did not cover themselves in glory in 2017. The portfolio approach diversifies you against injury, suspension or disappointing play. Yet, each portfolio achieved similar yards/attempt and total yards as the 3 high draft picks, for less overall guarantee / draft capital. As a team, NE and PHI ranked 1st and 8th in offensive DVOA, respectively (the Eagles won the Super Bowl). Also, note that NE’s total 2017 expenditure, while high, was less than Le’Veon Bell’s cap number. JAX additionally paid $6MM in 2017 for Chris Ivory, who offered minimal return for this expenditure. As Harry Markowitz showed, the portfolio approach offers something vanishingly rare in economics: a free lunch. A properly constructed portfolio lowers risk, without sacrificing expected return. (Though running backs are risky, they are independently risky. Idiosyncratic risk is diversifiable.)

In summary, Dave Gettleman in his press conference constructed a straw man. The case for positional value does not rest on running back longevity. Instead the TL;DR argument is as follows:

Using a high draft pick on a running back is a bad bet. At best, you expend draft capital in order to pay a guaranteed contract at a market equivalent price for a good player. At worst, you overpay twice: in draft capital and guaranteed salary for a bad player.
Drafting a running back is risky.
By assembling a portfolio of RBs, one can achieve similar performance to drafting a star, while diversifying risk, and saving draft / guarantee capital to deploy elsewhere.
Your mother was right about eggs and baskets.

The above argument relies upon the prior work of a number of individuals who sit behind keyboards, all of whom have advanced degrees in a quantitative field such as economics, and none of whom have played a snap of professional football. Gettleman, a #TrueFootballMan, will confidently dismiss this argument, regardless of its merit, due to its provenance. Eagles fans should pray he never gets fired, and lives forever.

Is The Eagles GM Sabotaging Chip Kelly?

I'm starting to think Chip Kelly, our beloved head coach and offensive mastermind, may not be on the same page with the Eagles general manager. In fact, hot take alert here, the GM may be actively sabotaging Chip. Let's examine the evidence.

In 2013, Kelly proved he could take a collection of players drafted by other people and mold them into a successful team. The defense, sure, was a bit rough. But Kelly inherited an offense of Andy Reid's making and turned it into something special. The offensive line dominated, with the left side anchored by two all-pro players, an emerging athletic center, wily veteran at right guard, and a top pick at right tackle. Meanwhile, Kelly's frenetic, quick-strike offensive style was matched perfectly by the dynamic big play duo of DeSean Jackson and LeSean McCoy, who combined for 3,480 yards on the season—including 42 plays of more than 20 yards. Kelly even made Nick Foles, an immobile quarterback with a questionable arm, look like a star.

But I look at the 2015 Eagles, and it seems the GM actively tried to rid Chip of all his best players. He swapped the Foles for Sam Bradford, who costs more and has a terrible injury history. He ditched both of the Eagles' homegrown, in-their-prime dynamic wide receivers for a bunch of unproven youngsters supplemented with empty threats (this week notwithstanding) Riley Cooper and Miles Austin. He flipped McCoy, a shifty home run hitter, for north-south runners, then refused—over Chip's strenuous protests, I'm sure—to put any resources into the aging offensive line that made the whole thing work.

What Kelly's left with is an offense that looks nothing like the type of team he's been successful with in the past. Foles was never a running quarterback, but the current starter can't even execute read option plays for fear he won't survive the next hit. And Bradford doesn't even have the confidence, despite a decent arm, to throw downfield, wasting Chip's proven ability to scheme players open. His twice-a-game realization that there might be open players beyond 5 yards has corresponded with a brief one-quarter offensive resurgence in each game.

The coach probably could have told the GM that the running back position wasn't his limiting factor in the first two years. When defenders shot into the backfield in 2014, McCoy actually made many of them miss and got positive yards. Spending big to get shiny new running backs was much less important than making sure the blockers ahead of them weren't just terrible backups and journeymen. The Eagles GM even had the gall to extend both Allen Barbre and Andrew Gardner, moves which can only be interpreted as a straight up middle finger to his run-first coach.

To be fair, the GM has added talent on the defensive side, bringing it up to average or perhaps even slightly above. But even against weak quarterbacks like Kirk Cousins, the unit's flaws are obvious. While the defensive line is shutting out running backs, giving up the 3rd-fewest yards per carry in the NFL, this is a passing league. The pass rush is nonexistent, with a sack rate of just 3.4%, 5th-worst. Fletcher Cox and Bennie Logan are disruptive run defenders, but can't get to the quarterback. Connor Barwin and Brandon Graham are solid players but not sack artists. That meant that in the final minutes on Sunday, with Washington marching down the field, the Eagles failed to get any pressure. It doesn't help, of course, that the secondary is still suspect.

When you look at all of it together, it's clear that something needs to be done before the Eagles GM torpedoes our head coach's obvious talent. Fire this idiot, I say, and hire someone who knows what he's doing. Heck, maybe give Chip Kelly a chance to take over player personnel. He could probably do just as well.

Why The Eagles Must Upgrade From Riley Cooper, In One Photo

There's no shortage of opinion when it comes to Riley Cooper, the Eagles' soon-to-be free agent wide receiver best known for his racial outburst at a Kenny Chesney concert last year. That off-the-field incident was itself sufficient reason for many fans to want to see Cooper gone. I'm not going to wade into that moral morass, but rather address the sizable room for debate about his on the field performance.

Cooper had what was obviously a breakout season in 2013. After posting a total of just 46 receptions for 679 yards and 5 TDs in his first three years, he took over the starting lineup for an injured Jeremy Maclin and finished the regular season with 47 receptions, 835 yards, and 8 TDs. Plus, he scored another productive 6/68/1 line in the Eagles' wild card game.

Cooper also put positive tape out there. He's the type of big-bodied blocking wide receiver that Chip Kelly values to augment his running game down the field. And there's a good reason Cooper's stats went way up once Nick Foles took over. He became especially effective on deep throws and in the red zone, where he was adept at adjusting to Foles' occasional errant jump balls.

Despite all of that good news, I wouldn't sign Riley Cooper to a long term starter's contract. And the biggest reason may sound counter-intuitive: despite the clear QB-WR connection, the more you build an Eagles offense around Foles, the more you need an upgrade from Cooper at wide receiver. Here's the proof, summed up in one All-22 shot (from the very first play of the Saints game):

Kelly talks about his offense in terms of simple math. He wants to run the football and he wants to have a numbers advantage up front when he does so. That means more blockers than defenders in the box, not the other way around -- and there are two ways to achieve this.

The first is to have a dangerous read-option constraint play built into the basic runs. By reading a defender instead of blocking him, the quarterback can freeze that unblocked man and enable better numbers on the play side. The second is to have dangerous wide receiver threats on the outside (ideally spread way outside) that force the defense to respect the passing game down the field. Defensive coordinators can't stack the box and provide help to both corners on the outside at the same time.

As you can see in the above photo, the Saints do not respect Cooper as a passing threat. While both Eagles receivers face man coverage, DeSean Jackson's corner has safety help over the top. The Saints, rightfully, fear Jackson's speed. They don't have that same concern about Cooper, who they're perfectly willing to leave matched up in single coverage at the bottom of the image. The safety whose job could be to protect against the deep ball to that side has entered the box instead. The Saints would much rather add an extra defender down by the line of scrimmage to combat LeSean McCoy and the rushing attack.

Thus, on this play the Saints have a numbers advantage up front: seven defenders in the box against six Eagles blockers. If Michael Vick were in the backfield, that wouldn't be so bad. The zone read can be a powerful weapon if defenders respect it. Foles is never going to inspire that respect. Yes, he can still make it work on occasion, pulling out a few surprise yards here or there, and freezing a confused defender now and then. But the read constraint will not work consistently without a run threat at QB, and therefore the run game will not work consistently against a numbers disadvantage up front.

If Foles is the Eagles' quarterback going forward -- and he has certainly earned that right -- then the offense needs other constraints. The obvious secondary options are wide receivers that the defense needs to respect.** Jackson is half of that puzzle. Cooper is not. The Saints treated him on this play as most defenses did this season, reveling in the opportunity to gain an advantage in the box and daring Cooper to beat them.

Cooper certainly had a breakout season, with career highs in all categories. But if he were a wide receiver worth spending starter-level money on, he would have consistently beat the single-coverage insult he face on a weekly basis and forced defenses to start respecting him. He did no such thing, and the numbers show it.

Pro Football Focus tracks a stat called yards per route run, focusing on receiver production on all snaps they ran a passing route. Some of the consensus best receivers in the game score highly on this list: the top ten is Julio Jones, Calvin Johnson, Josh Gordon, Justin Blackmon, Anquan Boldin, DeSean Jackson, Antonio Brown, Alshon Jeffrey, Andre Johnson, and AJ Green. These are players who combine two important attributes of a top receiver: production when targeted, and a high number of targets.

As I just mentioned, Jackson placed sixth on this list. That was thanks, first of all, to the second-highest yards per target of any receiver in the league: 11.2, only behind deep threat Kenny Stills and a step above all-around beasts Gordon and Jordy Nelson. You may be surprised to know that Riley Cooper also placed in the top ten on yards per target, netting 10.3 yards per pass thrown his way.

But the difference between Jackson and Cooper comes in the number of times they're targeted. Jackson, despite a spread-the-wealth offense and defenses putting heavy emphasis on stopping him, was in the top third most-targeted per route run. But out of 94 receivers with at least 25% of their team's targets, Cooper was a lowly 79th (right next to underperforming slot buddy Jason Avant). Cooper was targeted only 15% of his routes, compared to Jackson's 22% -- even though Cooper faced the single coverage shown above nearly all year.

The split between Cooper's rank in target percentage and his rank in yards per target is extreme, and may make it easier to understand the type of receiver he is. For example, there are certain receivers who were targeted a lot but have low yardage production on those targets. Some are slot receivers, like Cole Beasley for Dallas and Julian Edelman for New England. The others are underperforming #1 wide receivers on bad offenses: Buffalo's Stevie Johnson, Jacksonville's Cecil Shorts, Washington's Pierre Garson, and Tampa Bay's Vincent Jackson.

Cooper had the opposite problem. He was targeted few times despite solid performance on those targets. What receivers put up that same split last year? Secondary receivers who aren't particularly good, but get single coverage because the defense doesn't consider them threats: the aforementioned Stills in New Orleans, Tampa Bay's Tiquan Underwood, Dallas' rookie Terrance Williams, San Diego's Eddie Royal, Seattle's Doug Baldwin, Green Bay's James Jones, Kansas City's Donnie Avery. As far as the stats are concerned, these are Cooper's most direct comparables, and none of them (with the possible exception of Williams' upside) are players you would be excited to have as a starting wide receiver on your offense.

That's the type of player Riley Cooper is: a replacement-level starter that defenses are more than happy to leave alone to gameplan against actual receiving threats like Jimmy Graham, Dez Bryant, Jordy Nelson, and DeSean Jackson -- and actual running threats like DeMarco Murray, Jamaal Charles, and LeSean McCoy. If the Eagles let Maclin walk in free agency and re-up with Cooper as their #2 wide receiver, you'll hear the champagne popping in defensive coordinator meetings across the NFC. With Foles neutering the read-option attack, Chip Kelly needs wide receivers on the outside who can stretch out the defense and give McCoy room to run. Cooper, for all his other strengths, isn't that guy. And that means you not only don't pay to keep him, but you also actively look for an upgrade.

**One caveat: the offense needs at least one more receiving threat from somewhere. While wide receiver is the obvious play, it's not the only one. In his rookie season, Zach Ertz did finish sixth among tight ends on yards per pass route run. Just saying.

All The All-22 You Need For The Wild Card Round

There has been a wealth of coaches tape coverage this season that I've been woefully negligent about linking to from this blog. Hopefully all of you have caught on without my help, but make sure to catch up on the work of our esteemed Philly analysts:

Sheil Kapadia has two All-22 posts this week. The first is on the introduction of the sweep run, with narrated insights from the offensive line. The second looks back at Mychal Kendricks' performance against Jimmy Graham in 2012 and against other tight ends in general. That'll be a key matchup in Saturday's wild card game.
Derek Sarley, meanwhile, took his usual scattershot approach over at the Daily News/Philly.com. Looks like Monte Kiffin's main advice to his defense was to hold early and often, but Nick Foles bears some responsibility for the offense's misfires as well. The QB missed opportunities and made some surprisingly bad calls on packaged plays. Hopefully that gets worked out this week.
Last but not least, Ryan over at Chip Wagon gave us more diagrams of new packaged plays and run game tweaks.

Should vs. Will: Pre-Draft Eagles Offense Breakdown

The draft finally arrives this week, which means it's time to take one final look at the Eagles roster and figure out where the team stands, what spots are in good shape, and what is in desperate need of a talent infusion. Today we'll take on the offense, noting what I think the Eagles should do at each position against what I think they will do.

Quarterback: Michael Vick, Nick Foles, Dennis Dixon, G.J. Kinne -- one of these things is not like the others. I mean, sure, "Everybody has two legs," but plenty of read-option in mini-camp reinforces what kind of player Chip Kelly is looking for. Foles is not in the long term plans. Unfortunately, none of the other guys look like they are either. Vick is a workable stopgap, but the other two players are no more than third-string system fits. The question is whether this draft gives the Eagles an opportunity to add that franchise quarterback. Consensus seems to be that Geno Smith isn't worth the fourth overall pick. EJ Manuel is really the only other athletic quarterback likely to be taken early -- and he comes with even higher risk.

QB Should: Don't over think it. Quarterback is the most important position and you need to take them early and often. Smith has all the NFL tools plus experience running a fast-paced offense. I would trade back a few slots and draft him. And if not Smith, than seriously consider getting Manuel at the top of the second round. QB Will: Nothing, maybe a late round pick. Start looking at the 2014 class.

Running Back: LeSean McCoy said the new offense is "like a freaking track meet," yet as of this moment there are only three running backs on the roster: McCoy, Bryce Brown, and Chris Polk. Assuming he has worked on his fumbling issues, Brown joins McCoy to make one of the most dynamic 1-2 backfields in the NFL. But who else will be taking the baton? Polk was a good player in college, but he had a shoulder injury and didn't play at all as a rookie -- although the team kept him on the roster all year. Can't expect anything from him at this point. The niche this group needs to fill is a smaller third-down back to slot in with McCoy's shifty stardom and Brown's raw, big-bodied talent. If Kelly's offense works out, there should be plenty of space for all three to run through.

RB Should: Early round running backs need to be players who can start, but I'm focused on later in the draft. Whether it's Kenjon Barner or Kerwynn Williams, a speedster with bonus kick return skills would be a perfect fit. RB Will: At least one late-round back plus another two UDFAs.

Wide Receiver: The Eagles currently have 12 receivers on the roster. Most of them aren't much more than camp bodies, but there are hard decisions to be made at the top. In the short term, I doubt Jason Avant is long with this team seeing as old, slow receivers wouldn't seem to be at the top of Kelly's wishlist. Jeremy Maclin, meanwhile, is entering his contract year. No one can deny his overall production over his first four seasons, and I'm always in favor of retaining young talent. That said, he's never developed into the star that many expected and probably isn't worth top free agent money. Outside of those two and DeSean Jackson, there's not much to go on. Riley Cooper and Arrelious Benn have flashed talent and it would be fabulous to see one of them step into the valued "big WR role" we've been waiting for.

WR Should: Trade "culture carrier" Avant to Andy Reid for some seventh round pick he doesn't want. Draft a WR in the fourth-fifth round with starting potential; without knowing exactly what Kelly's looking for, it's tough to pick out one or two. WR Will: Keep Avant at least through training camp, draft a late round receiver.

Tight End: On the surface, you don't need to tinker much with this spot. Brent Celek has been an above-average tight end for years and the team just signed James Casey to take on expanded, versatile role. Clay Harbor deserves some competition but otherwise they're in good shape. I wonder, though, what Kelly and Howie Roseman think about Celek long term. You don't sign Casey if you think the incumbent can already perform as well, and starting in 2014 Celek costs nothing to cut.

TE Should: Focus on more pressing needs and check back in a year. Add a high-risk, high-reward late round pick or UDFA to compete. TE Will: In a good class, draft a third-fourth round tight end with upside. Travis Kelce, anyone?

Offensive Line: I've called the offensive line the biggest question mark on the team. Ideally, Jason Peters, Todd Herremans, and Jason Kelce will return from injury, joining Evan Mathis as four-fifths of a great line. But that's no guarantee, and it doesn't start to answer any of the subsequent questions: what about right guard? what about depth? what about the future? The unit needs an infusion of talent to compete across all positions and the team did next to nothing to address that in free agency.

OL Should: Outside of my general admonishment to never pass on a QB, this is where I'd put my focus with the fourth overall pick. Eric Fisher looks like a perfect combination of need and value. Best case scenario he would start at right tackle immediately, pushing Herremans inside. I also wouldn't hesitate to pick up another linemen or two later on. OL Will: Draft Fisher. I'd peg this as the most likely outcome on Thursday.

Photo from Getty.

The Adjustment Bureau

On-again-off-again blogger Derek Sarley hits us with another great All-22 post about the Eagles defensive issues on Sunday. Prepare to get educated about gap assignments against the run.

All-22: Hey Look, An Eagles Run Game!

Was that really Andy Reid on the sideline last Sunday? The Eagles called 17 runs in the second half against the Giants, shocking pretty much everyone. And, as I pointed out on Monday, that new focus on the run game made Michael Vick into a much better quarterback. With the pressure off of his back, Vick completed 8 of 11 attempts for 109 yards in the second half.

Let's dive into the All-22 coaches film on this one. The first thing to note is that the Eagles didn't just run the ball more—they called different run plays. The staple of the Howard Mudd offensive line is the stretch to the outside (read more about that here). Those outside runs behind athletic linemen worked great last year, but the patchwork offensive line the Eagles trotted out last week couldn't execute the same way.

In the second half (except down by the goal line), the Eagles abandoned those run schemes in favor of more straight-up blocking, often with the I-Formation. It worked:

Linemen set the edge, McCoy follows his FB.

Even Dallas Reynolds got great push here.

The Eagles also used Stanley Havili in an H-Back set up for a few plays, giving them some interesting flexibility. Here they fake the toss to Bryce Brown and hand off to Havili coming up the gut instead. He follows Todd Herremans into the hole:

Later, they came back to the same look and used it to get numbers on the right side instead:

Suddenly, with the run game working, Vick's job gets so much easier. The linebackers actually bought this run fake, leaving Brent Celek wide open over the middle:

And with the defense now trying to both stop the run and prevent the pass, remembering to contain and control Vick's scrambling becomes a greater problem. He ran 3 times for 30 yards in the second half:

More All-22: The Eagles Early Offensive Line Struggles, How The Eagles Offense Made It Easy On Mike Vick

The Eagles Early Offensive Line Struggles

The Eagles offensive line didn't have a fun time early in Sunday's game against the Giants. In fact, they were getting beaten at nearly every turn. Michael Vick was taking hits, LeSean McCoy couldn't find holes. It wasn't pretty.

Dallas Reynolds and Demetress Bell played especially poorly, but the scariest thing is that they weren't the only culprits. The whole line was getting beat, sometimes one-on-one and other times because of communication breakdowns. Check out a bunch of the plays below:

Kiwanuka, playing nose guard, manhandles Reynolds while Mathis looks the other way.

McCoy blocks the blitzer, but Watkins doesn't get help from Reynolds on Rocky Bernard.

Reynolds, pulling, whiffs on Chase Blackburn. Bell also can't sustain block on JPP.

Herremans gets beat inside by Justin Tuck.

Communication issue leaves blitzer unblocked.

More All-22: How The Eagles Offense Made It Easy On Mike Vick; Hey Look, An Eagles Run Game!